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IntroductIon
This is a momentous time for reflection on the recourse to for-
eign and international law by the courts of the European Union 
and the United States. In the EU, the comparative law method is a 
settled practice employed by the European Court of Justice1 since 
the founding of what was then the European Communities (now 
Union). This method denotes the ways in which the Union courts 
take account of the laws of the member states, as well as other 
sources of foreign and international law to varying degrees, for the 
purposes of ruling on matters of EU law in the cases brought before 
them.2 Yet, over the past decade, renewed attention has been paid 
to the use of this method by the European Court of Justice3 and the 
national (supreme and constitutional) courts in Europe,4 in large 
part on account of the changes to the EU regime of fundamental 
rights protection that were brought about by the entry into force 
of the Lisbon Treaty,5 namely with respect to the EU’s envisaged 
1. Under the first paragraph of Article 19(1) of the Consolidated Version of the 
Treaty on European Union, June 7, 2016, 2016 O.J. (C 202) 13 [hereinafter TEU], the 
institution of the Court of Justice of the European Union comprises the (European) 
Court of Justice (ECJ), General Court (EGC), and specialized courts (which used to 
include the EU Civil Service Tribunal (CST)), collectively referred to as the Union 
courts or Union judicature. Of note, on September 1, 2016, the CST was dissolved; 
first instance jurisdiction in disputes between the Union and its servants was trans-
ferred to the EGC, along with the seven posts of the Judges sitting at the CST. See 
Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2015/2422 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 16 December 2015 Amending Protocol No. 3 on the Statute of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union, 2015 O.J. (L 341) 14; Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2016/1192 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 on the Transfer to the General 
Court of Jurisdiction at First Instance in Disputes Between the European Union and 
Its Servants, 2016 O.J. (L 200) 137 [hereinafter Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2016/1192].
2. The comparative law method may be utilized by the relevant Union court (as 
set out supra note 1) pursuant to its respective bases of jurisdiction under the EU 
treaties. The fact that focus is put on the ECJ may be explained, among other things, 
by virtue of its (so far exclusive) jurisdiction to deliver preliminary rulings and its 
appellate jurisdiction in respect of the EGC’s decisions, which have afforded the basis 
for many rulings involving the comparative law method, especially with regard to 
fundamental rights and other general principles of EU law.
3. See, e.g., Gráinne de Búrca, After the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: 
The Court of Justice as a Human Rights Adjudicator?, 20 MaastrIcht J. Eur. & Comp. 
L. 168 (2013); Christopher McCrudden, Using Comparative Reasoning in Human 
Rights Adjudication: The Court of Justice of the European Union and the European 
Court of Human Rights Compared, 15 CambrIdge Y.B. Eur. Legal Stud. 383 (2012–
2013) and citations therein. See also the present volume.
4. National courts outside the EU may also be taken into account. See, e.g., courts 
and comparatIve law (Mads Andenas & Duncan Fairgrieve eds., 2015); hIghest courts 
and globalIsatIon (Sam Muller & Sidney Richards eds., 2010); Special Issue on Highest 
Courts and Transnational Interaction, 8 utrecht l. rev., no. 2, 2012. With regard to 
interaction between the ECJ and the national courts, see also, e.g., ConstItutIonal 
ConversatIons In Europe: Actors, TopIcs and Procedures (Monica Claes et al. eds., 2012).
5. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 [herein-
after Lisbon Treaty]. For the most recent consolidations, see TEU, supra note 1; 
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, June 
7, 2016, 2016 O.J. (C 202) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]. For brevity’s sake, references to for-
mer provisions of the EU or EC treaties are replaced in this Article by references to 
the current provisions of the TEU or TFEU.
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accession to the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR)6 and the binding effects 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (here-
inafter the Charter).7 In the United States, the debate between U.S. 
Supreme Court Justices Scalia and Breyer on the constitutional rel-
evance of foreign court decisions,8 as commemorated by this sym-
posium, highlighted key issues concerning the potential utility, 
difficulties, and tensions associated with the reference to foreign and 
international law in domestic constitutional adjudication.9 These 
issues continue to play out in various areas of U.S. Supreme Court 
case law,10 some of which echoes the European Court of Justice’s case 
law in this context.
In the United States, reference to the use of the comparative law 
method is generally considered to be synonymous with the use of for-
eign and international law.11 Foreign law means the law of a coun-
try outside the United States, such as an EU member state, whereas 
international law denotes the law of international and suprana-
tional organizations, such as the EU in the sense of the treaties 
and other instruments of EU law within the Union legal order, as 
distinct from extra-EU legal instruments such as the ECHR, which 
the European Court of Human Rights is mandated to interpret. In 
the EU, however, the comparative law method has a special mean-
ing, since it is focused on the laws of the member states. Thus, as 
compared to the American setting, in which the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
recourse to sources of foreign and international law is typically 
6. Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR].
7. TEU, supra note 1, art. 6(1)–(2). The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, Dec. 7, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1, was reenacted by the European 
Parliament, Council, and Commission on the day that the Lisbon Treaty, supra 
note 5, was signed, and reprinted alongside the consolidated versions of the TEU 
and TFEU. For the current consolidation, see Consolidated Version of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, June 7, 2016, 2016 O.J. (C 202) 389 
[hereinafter Charter]. With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Charter has 
the same legal value as the EU treaties, i.e., as primary Union law. See TEU, supra 
note 1, art. 6(1), first para. The EU’s accession to the ECHR has not yet occurred. 
See Opinion 2/13, Accession of the EU to the ECHR, EUR-Lex CELEX 62013CV0002 
(Dec. 18, 2014).
8. Transcript of Discussion Between U.S. Supreme Court Justices Antonin 
Scalia and Stephen Breyer on the Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court 
Decisions, American University Washington College of Law (Jan. 13, 2005), https://
www.wcl.american.edu/secle/founders/2005/050113.cfm [hereinafter Transcript]; see 
also Norman Dorsen, A Conversation Between U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 3 Int’l 
J. Const. L. 519 (2005).
9. As distinguished from situations in which foreign and international law 
are relevant through domestic norms. Regarding the reference to EU law and case 
law in U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence in this latter sense, see, e.g., Daimler 
AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 763 (2014); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 
S. Ct. 2780, 2803–04 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro 
Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004).
10. Regarding the Eighth Amendment, see, e.g., Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 
(2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). For other exam-
ples, see infra Parts I.B, II.B, III.B, and III.C.
11. Some commentators prefer umbrella terms such as “transnational 
law” to cover the two. See, e.g., vIckI c. Jackson, ConstItutIonal Engagement In a 
TransnatIonal Era 10 (2010).
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viewed as “external” to the domestic norms being interpreted, the 
comparative law method of the European Court of Justice centers 
on national norms that are “internal” to the Union legal order and 
that sustain the interpretation and formulation of EU law. This may 
help to explain in part why the stakes of the debate regarding the 
comparative law method in the EU are different from those in the 
United States, and ironically, the debate in the EU appears to be con-
cerned with encouraging greater (and more transparent) recourse by 
the European Court of Justice to the rules, principles, and traditions 
of the member states, whereas in the United States it appears to be 
geared towards discouraging reference to foreign and international 
law by courts altogether.
The importance of the comparative law method in the Union 
legal order should not be underestimated. That method regularly 
informs the workings of the Union courts, and along the lines of 
Justice Breyer’s remarks in the aforementioned debate,12 it is just 
as relevant in the “less glamorous” cases that traverse all areas of 
EU law. As discussed elsewhere,13 there are general and specific legal 
bases in the treaties authorizing the Union courts to use the compar-
ative law method in situations involving the discovery and develop-
ment of general principles of EU law (gap filling), the interpretation 
of rules and concepts of EU law (interpretation), and the review 
of the compatibility of national law with EU law or of Union mea-
sures with higher-ranking rules of EU law (compatibility review).14 
Accordingly, the comparative law method is an integral part of the 
dialogue between the European Court of Justice and the national 
courts, as well as of the relationship between the Union and the 
member states generally.15 Moreover, since this method involves the 
Union courts looking to the laws of the member states (or other juris-
dictions as the case may be)16 as part of finding an appropriate solu-
tion in the particular case, it allows for a dynamic interpretation of 
12. See Transcript, supra note 8.
13. See, e.g., Koen Lenaerts & Kathleen Gutman, The Comparative Law Method 
and the Court of Justice of the European Union: Interlocking Legal Orders Revisited, 
in courts and comparatIve law, supra note 4, at 141 and citations therein.
14. To be sure, these situations are not airtight; for example, the Court’s pre-
liminary ruling jurisdiction on the interpretation of EU law indirectly determines 
whether a particular national rule is compatible with the provisions of EU law being 
interpreted. Moreover, these situations correspond to the functions played by gen-
eral principles of EU law in the Union legal order. See, e.g., Koen Lenaerts & José 
A. Gutiérrez-Fons, The Constitutional Allocation of Powers and General Principles of 
EU Law, 47 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 1629 (2010).
15. See Case C-62/14, Gauweiler v. Deutscher Bundestag, Opinion of Advocate 
General Cruz Villalón, EUR-Lex CELEX 62014CC0062, ¶ 61 (Jan. 14, 2015) (empha-
sizing the role of the constitutional traditions common to the member states in bring-
ing about “the basic convergence of the common constitutional identity of the Union 
and that of each of the Member States”).
16. Of note, U.S. law and case law appear in a wide variety of advocate general 
opinions and may be brought to the attention of the Union courts by other means. See 
Lenaerts & Gutman, supra note 13, at 145–49 and citations therein. To date, how-
ever, they have not explicitly figured in the operative parts or reasoning of the Union 
courts in their judgments.
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EU law that takes account of and adjusts to societal changes taking 
place at the national and Union levels.
Following from these remarks, the purpose of this contribution is 
to examine some salient applications of the comparative law method 
in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice in light of 
relevant case law of the U.S. Supreme Court involving recourse to 
foreign and international law in domestic constitutional adjudica-
tion. It is divided into three parts, which largely correspond to the 
key situations mentioned above—gap filling, interpretation, and 
compatibility review—in which the comparative law method arises 
in the European Court of Justice’s case law. The first part concerns 
the Court’s recourse to the comparative law method in the context 
of the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of sexual orienta-
tion, highlighting parallels with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision 
in Obergefell v. Hodges.17 The second part takes up the comparative 
law method in the context of the interpretation of EU law, focusing 
on the Court’s elaboration of the autonomous concepts of “spouse” 
and “marriage” and the potential implications for the mobility of 
same-sex couples in the EU, drawing insights from the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decisions in United States v. Windsor18 and Obergefell. The 
third part discusses the comparative law method in the context of 
the Court’s review of national and Union measures for compliance 
with EU fundamental rights, which invites comparisons with some 
recent U.S. Supreme Court cases on the incorporation doctrine and 
the standard of review.
This contribution does not claim to be comprehensive or exhaus-
tive. As just alluded to, there is a voluminous (and ever-increasing) 
body of scholarly literature and jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Justice and the U.S. Supreme Court bearing on the recourse to 
foreign and international law,19 and even the cases that are men-
tioned in this contribution cannot be treated in depth. Still, the com-
parative reflections set forth in this contribution provide some “food 
for thought,” in Justice Breyer’s words,20 which helps to enrich the 
transatlantic judicial conversation between the European Court of 
Justice and the U.S. Supreme Court, notwithstanding the differences 
in institutional framework and judicial architecture bearing on the 
function of each Court and the tasks entrusted to them under their 
respective constitutional charters.
I. dIscovery and development of general prIncIples of eu law
Within the extensive case law involving the European Court of 
Justice’s discovery and development of general principles of EU law 
17. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
18. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
19. Akin to the comparative law method applied by the ECJ, the literature indi-
cates that the reference to foreign and international law in U.S. Supreme Court 
case law is a long-standing practice. See, e.g., InternatIonal Law In the U.S. Supreme 
Court: ContInuIty and Change (D.L. Sloss et al. eds., 2011); Sarah H. Cleveland, Our 
International Constitution, 31 yale J. Int’l l. 1 (2006).
20. See Transcript, supra note 8.
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on the basis of the comparative law method,21 its jurisprudence on 
the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation 
stands out because it highlights the dynamic nature of the com-
parative law method and invites comparison with the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s judgment in Obergefell v. Hodges.22
A. Prohibition of Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation
In Grant,23 decided in 1998, the European Court of Justice 
held that Community (now Union) law, as it stood at the time, did 
not cover discrimination based on sexual orientation involving 
a person in a stable relationship with a person of the same sex.24 
It also ruled, on the basis of a comparative analysis of the laws of 
the member states,25 that in the present state of what was then 
Community law, stable relationships between two persons of the 
same sex were not to be regarded as equivalent to marriage or to 
stable relationships between persons of the opposite sex, with the 
result that an employer was not required by Community law to 
treat the situation of a person who had a stable relationship with 
a partner of the same sex as equivalent to that of a person who is 
married to, or has a stable relationship outside marriage with, a 
partner of the opposite sex.26 It added, however, that “it is for the 
legislature alone to adopt, if appropriate, measures which may 
affect that position.”27
Indeed, as the Court acknowledged in that judgment,28 the 
Amsterdam Treaty entered into force the following year and intro-
duced what is now Article 19 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU), conferring competence on the Union leg-
islature to adopt measures to combat various forms of discrimina-
tion, including that based on sexual orientation.29 One of the Union 
measures adopted under this provision is Directive 2000/78,30 which 
establishes a general framework for equal treatment in employ-
ment and occupation. The Court’s interpretation of this Directive has 
21. For a general discussion and survey of general principles of EU law in the 
Union legal order, see, e.g., Koen Lenaerts & PIet Van Nuffel, european unIon law 
825–61 (Robert Bray & Nathan Cambien eds., 3d ed. 2011).
22. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
23. Case C-249/96, Grant v. South-West Trains Ltd., 1998 E.C.R. I-621.
24. Id. at 651 (¶ 47).
25. Id. at 647 (¶ 32). The ECJ also examined decisions of the European Court 
(and Commission) of Human Rights. See id. at 647–48 (¶¶ 33–34).
26. Id. at 648 (¶ 35).
27. Id. (¶ 36).
28. Id. at 651 (¶ 48).
29. See TFEU, supra note 5, art. 19(1). The Nice Treaty, Mar. 10, 2001, 2001 O.J. 
(C 80) 1, added a second paragraph—now TFEU art. 19(2).
30. Council Directive 2000/78/EC of Nov. 27, 2000 Establishing a General 
Framework for Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation, 2000 O.J. (L 
303) 16. For broader comparative discussion, see, e.g., Gráinne de Búrca, The 
Trajectories of European and American Antidiscrimination Law, 60 Am. J. Comp. L. 1 
(2012); Katerina Linos, Path Dependence in Discrimination Law: Employment Cases 
in the United States and the European Union, 35 Yale J. Int’l L. 115 (2010).
THE COMPARATIVE LAW METHOD AND THE ECJ 8472016]
produced a steady stream of cases affording protection against dis-
crimination for same-sex couples.31
For example, in Maruko,32 the Court received a reference for a 
preliminary ruling from a German court involving a same-sex life 
partner whose request for a survivor’s benefit had been rejected on 
the grounds that the national regulations only extended such ben-
efits to surviving spouses. It held that Directive 2000/78 precludes 
national rules under which a surviving life partner does not receive 
a survivor’s benefit equivalent to that granted to a surviving spouse, 
“even though, under national law, life partnership places persons of 
the same sex in a situation comparable to that of spouses” as regards 
that benefit.33 The Court left it to the national court to determine 
whether a surviving life partner is in a comparable situation to that 
of a spouse who is entitled to the survivor’s benefit, but it underlined 
that if the national court made such a finding, the national rules at 
issue would constitute direct discrimination within the meaning of 
the Directive.34
Thereafter, in Römer,35 the Court received a similar reference 
from another German court, this time involving a situation in which 
the applicant was denied the greater supplementary retirement pen-
sion given to married persons on account of his registered life part-
nership status. It ruled that Directive 2000/78 precludes national 
rules in which a pensioner in a registered life partnership receives a 
lower supplementary retirement pension than that granted to a mar-
ried pensioner, provided that in the member state concerned, mar-
riage is reserved to persons of different gender, whereas persons of 
the same gender only have access to a registered life partnership.36 
It found that there is in fact direct discrimination on grounds of sex-
ual orientation because, under national law, the life partner is in a 
legal and factual situation comparable to that of a married person as 
regards that pension, although the Court again left it to the national 
court to assess comparability in light of the benefit in question.37
Of note, in his opinion in Römer, Advocate General Jääskinen 
considered, in the context of providing a comprehensive analy-
sis of the referring court’s questions,38 that the prohibition of 
31. See also, e.g., Joined Cases C-124/11, C-125/11 & C-143/11, Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland v. Dittrich, EUR-Lex CELEX 62011CJ0124 (Dec. 6, 2012). For detailed 
discussion, see, e.g., Geert De Baere & Kathleen Gutman, The Impact of the European 
Union and the European Court of Justice on European Family Law, in 1 The Impact 
of InstItutIons and OrganIsatIons on European FamIly Law 5 (Jens M. Scherpe ed., 
2016).
32. Case C-267/06, Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen, 2008 
E.C.R. I-1757.
33. Id. ¶ 73. See generally id. ¶¶ 65–73.
34. Id. ¶ 72.
35. Case C-147/08, Römer v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, 2011 E.C.R. I-3591.
36. Id. at 3666 (¶ 52).
37. Id.
38. In its fourth question, the referring court asked whether, if it was not estab-
lished that the national rules infringed Directive 2000/78, such rules infringed 
Article 157 TFEU or a general principle of EU law. See Case C-147/08, Römer, 
Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, 2011 E.C.R. at I-3626 (¶¶ 114–16).
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discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation should be regarded 
as a general principle of EU law.39 The Court found it unnecessary to 
give an answer to that question in its judgment.40 Thus, it remains to 
be seen how it may rule on that issue in future case law. That said, 
the Court’s approach in Mangold41 (especially in juxtaposition with 
Akzo Nobel)42 would appear to provide strong arguments for such 
recognition.43 Along the lines of the Court’s declaration of the gen-
eral principle of nondiscrimination on grounds of age in Mangold, a 
principle of nondiscrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is 
consistent with a specific task conferred on the EU in combating dis-
crimination (Article 19 TFEU),44 has been given specific expression 
by the Union legislature (Directive 2000/78), and mirrors a recent 
trend in the protection of fundamental rights at the Union level 
(Article 21 of the Charter).
Recently, in Hay,45 the Court received a reference from the 
French Court of Cassation that essentially asked whether Directive 
2000/78 precludes a provision in a collective agreement under which 
an employee who concludes a civil solidarity pact (PACS) with a per-
son of the same sex is not allowed to obtain the same benefits as 
those granted to married employees, in casu days of special leave 
and a salary bonus, where the national rules concerned do not allow 
persons of the same sex to marry.46 First, regarding the existence of 
direct discrimination, the Court held—this time performing the com-
parability exercise itself—that persons of the same sex who cannot 
enter into marriage and therefore conclude a PACS are in a situation 
comparable to that of couples who marry as regards benefits related 
to pay or working conditions, such as those at issue in the proceed-
ings.47 Furthermore, with respect to the very existence of discrimi-
nation, the Court declared, on the basis of Maruko and Römer, that 
rules of a member state that restrict pay- or work-related benefits 
to married employees constitute direct discrimination based on sex-
ual orientation against homosexual permanent employees in a PACS 
39. Id. at 3628–30 (¶¶ 125–31). See also Case C-528/13, Léger v. Ministre des 
Affaires sociales, de la Santé et des Droits des femmes, Opinion of Advocate General 
Mengozzi, EUR-Lex CELEX 62013CC0528, ¶ 45 n.55 (July 17, 2014).
40. Case C-147/08, Römer, 2011 E.C.R. at I-3670 (¶ 65).
41. Case C-144/04, Mangold v. Helm, 2005 E.C.R. I-9981.
42. See Case C-550/07 P, Akzo Nobel Chems. Ltd. v. Comm’n, Opinion of Advocate 
General Kokott, 2010 E.C.R. I-8301 at 8333 (¶¶ 95–96).
43. See Lenaerts & Gutman, supra note 13, at 160–67.
44. See also TFEU, supra note 5, art. 10 (one of the so-called horizontal clauses 
introduced by the Lisbon Treaty: “In defining and implementing its policies and 
activities, the Union shall aim to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic 
origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.”).
45. Case C-267/12, Hay v. Crédit agricole mutuel de Charente-Maritime et des 
Deux-Sèvres, EUR-Lex CELEX 62012CJ0267 (Dec. 12, 2013). The ECJ delivered its 
judgment without an advocate general opinion, as provided for cases raising “no new 
point of law,” under the fifth paragraph of Article 20 of the Statute of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union, being the Consolidated Version of Protocol (No. 3), 
annexed to the TEU, TFEU, and EAEC Treaty, June 7, 2016, 2016 O.J. (C 202) 210, as 
amended most recently by Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2016/1192, supra note 1.
46. Case C-267/12, Hay, ¶ 25.
47. Id. ¶¶ 35–37.
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arrangement who are in a comparable situation.48 The fact that the 
PACS, unlike the registered life partnership at issue in the earlier 
cases, was not restricted only to homosexual couples was irrelevant 
and did “not change the nature of the discrimination against homo-
sexual couples who, unlike heterosexual couples, could not, on the 
date of the facts in the main proceedings, legally enter into mar-
riage.”49 The difference in treatment based on the employees’ marital 
status, and not expressly on their sexual orientation, was still direct 
discrimination because only persons of different sexes could marry 
and homosexual employees were therefore unable to meet the con-
dition required for obtaining the benefit claimed.50 In this way, the 
Court took a strong position in Hay for ensuring equal protection for 
same-sex couples.
B. Echoes of Obergefell v. Hodges
In Obergefell v. Hodges,51 the U.S. Supreme Court52 held that 
the Fourteenth Amendment53 requires states, first, to license same-
sex marriages and, secondly, to recognize same-sex marriages val-
idly performed out-of-state.54 Four members of the Court dissented, 
emphasizing among other things that this was a matter for the 
states to decide through the democratic process.55 References to for-
eign sources were sprinkled throughout the judgment (as well as the 
oral arguments), generally in the dissenters’ discussion of the tradi-
tional conception of marriage as being between a man and a woman, 
as part of their refutation of a fundamental right to marry for same-
sex couples under the Fourteenth Amendment.56
Indeed, regarding the first issue, the majority of the Supreme 
Court declared that the right to marry is a fundamental right inher-
ent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal 
48. Id. ¶ 41.
49. Id. ¶ 43.
50. Id. ¶ 44.
51. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). For detailed discussion of this case and related prec-
edents, see, e.g., Symposium, 6 CalIf. L. Rev. CIr. 107 (2015); Symposium, FORUM 
Perspectives on Marriage Equality and the Supreme Court, 84 Fordham L. Rev.1 
(2015). See also infra note 64.
52. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices 
Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, 
Thomas, and Alito issued dissenting opinions.
53. u.s. const. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
54. The case involved proceedings in four states (Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, 
and Tennessee) that defined marriage as a union between a man and a woman. See 
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593.
55. See, e.g., id. at 2611 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2626 (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (filing separate dissent “to call attention to this Court’s threat to American 
democracy”).
56. See, e.g., id. at 2612 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2630 (Scalia, J., dis-
senting); id. at 2640 (Alito, J., dissenting). See also Zachary D. Kaufman, From the 
Aztecs to the Kalahari Bushmen: Conservative Justices’ Citation of Foreign Sources: 
Consistency, Inconsistency, or Evolution?, Yale J. Int’l L. OnlIne (2015), https://cam-
puspress.yale.edu/yjil/files/2012/09/kaufman-macro-proof-07-31-15-1ca947b.pdf.
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Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, same-sex couples 
cannot be deprived of that right and that liberty.57 It considered that 
the fundamental liberties protected by the Due Process Clause extend 
to certain personal choices central to individual dignity and auton-
omy, including intimate choices defining personal identity and beliefs, 
among them the right to marry.58 It then enumerated four principles 
and traditions demonstrating that the right to marry applies with 
equal force to same-sex couples.59 The majority also found that the 
right of same-sex couples to marry derives from the Equal Protection 
Clause, explaining that the two clauses are “connected in a profound 
way, though they set forth independent principles.”60 In the case 
of same-sex marriage, it held: “It is now clear that the challenged 
laws burden the liberty of same-sex couples, and it must be further 
acknowledged that they abridge central precepts of equality. . . . 
[S]ame-sex couples are denied all the benefits afforded to opposite-sex 
couples and are barred from exercising a fundamental right.”61
On the second issue, regarding whether the U.S. Constitution 
requires states to recognize same-sex marriages performed out-of-
state, the Court reasoned that since it held, in this case, that same-
sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry in all 
states, it followed that there was no lawful basis for a state to refuse 
to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another state 
on the ground of its same-sex character.62 In doing so, it stressed the 
instability and uncertainty caused by the present state of affairs:
For some couples, even an ordinary drive into a neighboring 
State to visit family or friends risks causing severe hardship 
in the event of a spouse’s hospitalization while across state 
lines. In light of the fact that many States already allow 
same-sex marriage—and hundreds of thousands of these 
marriages already have occurred—the disruption caused by 
the recognition bans is significant and ever-growing.63
57. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604.
58. Id. at 2597–98.
59. Id. at 2599–2602. In brief, the principles are: (1) “the right to personal choice 
regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy”; (2) marriage “sup-
ports a two-person union unlike any other in its importance to the committed individu-
als”; (3) marriage “safeguards children and families and thus draws meaning from related 
rights of childrearing, procreation, and education”; and (4) the “Court’s cases and the 
Nation’s traditions make clear that marriage is a keystone of [the American] social order.”
60. Id. at 2602–03.
61. Id. at 2604.
62. Id. at 2607–08. The Court’s decision effectively overturned section 2 of the 
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (though it was not explicitly 
mentioned therein), which provided:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall 
be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding 
of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship 
between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the 
laws of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim 
arising from such relationship.
63. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2607.
THE COMPARATIVE LAW METHOD AND THE ECJ 8512016]
Leaving aside the recognition issue for the moment, a prominent 
aspect of Obergefell (especially to European eyes) is the Supreme 
Court’s “fundamental rights” reasoning based on the combined force 
of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, as well as its repeated emphasis on dignity for same-
sex couples.64 It also draws attention to certain limitations associ-
ated with resting on grounds of equal protection, or equal treatment, 
alone, such as those relating to the fulfillment of the comparabil-
ity exercise and the potential leveling down of protection across the 
board. These points have resonance for the EU framework address-
ing discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, and may in turn 
prompt discussion of other normative sources of EU law providing 
protection in this regard, which leads to the next Part.
II. InterpretatIon of eu law
In the context of the interpretation of EU law, the European 
Court of Justice may resort to the comparative law method when 
the EU norm in question does not provide a solution to the problem. 
On the one hand, that method may reveal a solution common to the 
laws of the member states, which is then taken up for the interpre-
tation of the EU rules concerned.65 On the other hand, that method 
may reveal divergences among the laws of the member states, which 
afford the basis for the Court to establish an autonomous EU inter-
pretation of rules or concepts. This intersects with judicial lawmak-
ing, since in the course of interpreting EU law, the Court may be 
faced with formulating judge-made rules of Union law, or what may 
be called “European federal common law.”66 Notable examples are 
the Court’s elaboration of the concepts of “spouse” and “marriage” 
in Reed67 and D and Sweden v. Council,68 respectively, because they 
further illustrate the evolving nature of the comparative law method 
and invite comparisons with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
United States v. Windsor,69 which in combination with Obergefell 
64. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 129 Harv. 
L. Rev. F. 16 (2015); Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 
Harv. L. Rev. 147 (2015). For a broader discussion of dignity, see also, e.g., Luís Roberto 
Barroso, Here, There, and Everywhere: Human Dignity in Contemporary Law and in 
the Transnational Discourse, 35 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 331 (2012); Judith Resnik, 
Constructing the ‘Foreign’: American Law’s Relationship to Non-Domestic Sources, in 
Courts and ComparatIve Law, supra note 4, at 437, 441–46 and citations therein.
65. A classic example is Case 155/79, AM & S Europe Ltd. v. Commission, 1982 
E.C.R. 1575, concerning the concept of legal professional privilege (attorney–cli-
ent privilege in American parlance) under the EU competition rules. It was recently 
revisited in Case C-550/07 P, Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd. v. Commission, 2010 E.C.R. 
I-8301, in which the ECJ rejected the extension of this concept to communications 
with in-house lawyers.
66. Koen Lenaerts & Kathleen Gutman, “Federal Common Law” in the European 
Union: A Comparative Perspective from the United States, 54 Am. J. Comp. L. 1, 9 
(2006).
67. Case 59/85, Netherlands v. Reed, 1986 E.C.R. 1283.
68. Joined Cases C-122/99 P & C-125/99 P, D & Sweden v. Council, 2001 E.C.R. 
I-4319.
69. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
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v. Hodges70 has reverberations for the mobility of same-sex couples in 
the EU.
A. The European Court of Justice’s Formulation of the Autonomous 
Concepts of “Spouse” and “Marriage”
Reed,71 decided in 1986, turned on the issue of whether an 
unmarried British citizen cohabiting with another British citizen of 
the opposite sex for several years fell within the definition of “spouse” 
under Article 10(1)(a) of Regulation No. 1612/68.72 As the Regulation 
did not define this concept, it fell to the European Court of Justice, in 
a reference for a preliminary ruling from the Dutch Supreme Court, 
to decide whether the concept included unmarried cohabitants. The 
Court considered that “any interpretation of a legal term on the 
basis of social developments must take into account the situation in 
the whole Community [now Union], not merely one Member State.”73 
Heeding Advocate General Lenz’s opinion indicating the variations 
among the national traditions,74 the Court ruled: “In the absence of 
any indication of a general social development which would justify a 
broad construction, and in the absence of any indication to the con-
trary in the Regulation, it must be held that the term ‘spouse’ in 
Article 10 of the Regulation refers to a marital relationship only.”75
Thereafter, in its 2001 judgment in D and Sweden v. Council,76 
the Court formulated an EU concept of “marriage” in the context of 
a staff case77 involving the Council’s rejection of an official’s request 
to treat his same-sex relationship as equivalent to marriage in order 
to obtain certain benefits under the Staff Regulations. In his opin-
ion, Advocate General Mischo considered that, in light of Reed, “the 
definition of marriage includes only traditional marriage between 
two people of the opposite sex.”78 He also pointed out that the Union 
70. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
71. Case 59/85, Reed.
72. Articles 10 and 11 of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1612/68 of 15 October 
1968 on Freedom of Movement for Workers Within the Community, 1968 O.J. (L 
257) 475, were repealed and replaced by Directive 2004/38/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the Right of Citizens of the Union 
and Their Family Members to Move and Reside Freely Within the Territory of the 
Member States Amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and Repealing Directives 
64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/
EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC, 2004 O.J. (L 158) 77 [hereinafter Directive 
2004/38/EC]. See also Regulation (EU) No. 492/2011 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on Freedom of Movement for Workers Within the 
Union, 2011 O.J. (L 141) 1.
73. Case 59/85, Reed, 1986 E.C.R. at 1300 (¶ 13).
74. See id., Opinion of Advocate General Lenz, at 1294.
75. Id., Judgment of the Court, at 1300 (¶ 15).
76. Joined Cases C-122/99 P & C-125/99 P, D & Sweden v. Council, 2001 E.C.R. 
I-4319.
77. “Staff cases” are disputes between the Union and its servants. See TFEU, 
supra note 5, art. 270; see also supra note 1. For detailed discussion, see, e.g., Koen 
Lenaerts, Ignace MaselIs & Kathleen Gutman, EU Procedural Law 665–85 (Janek 
Tomasz Nowak ed., 2015).
78. Joined Cases C-122/99 P & C-125/99 P, D & Sweden, Opinion of Advocate 
General Mischo, 2001 E.C.R. at I-4329–30 (¶ 48).
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legislature had expressly decided not to adopt Sweden’s request to 
modify the Staff Regulations to assimilate same-sex registered part-
nerships with marriage, but instead to engage in further study of 
the matter.79 These points filtered into the Court’s judgment uphold-
ing the General Court’s interpretation of the Staff Regulations.80 
The Court held that “according to the definition generally accepted 
by the Member States, the term ‘marriage’ means a union between 
two persons of the opposite sex.”81 Although an increasing number 
of member states had “introduced, alongside marriage, statutory 
arrangements granting legal recognition to various forms of union 
between partners of the same sex or of the opposite sex and confer-
ring on such unions certain effects which . . . are the same as or com-
parable to those of marriage,” it found that “apart from their great 
diversity, such arrangements for registering partnerships between 
couples not previously recognised in law are regarded in the Member 
States as being distinct from marriage.”82 Accordingly, the Court for-
mulated an EU concept of “marriage” in line with the national legal 
systems and with the Union legislature’s intention not to effect 
changes to the Staff Regulations in this regard.83
B. Echoes of United States v. Windsor
United States v. Windsor84 provides an apt comparison. In this 
case, the U.S. Supreme Court85 declared section 3 of the Defense 
of Marriage Act (DOMA)86 unconstitutional under the Fifth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.87 Section 3 of DOMA provided 
that for the purposes of federal law, “the word ‘marriage’ means only 
79. Id. at 4330 (¶¶ 51–53).
80. Id., Judgment of the Court, at 4356 (¶ 48). Among other pleas submitted, the 
Court rejected the applicants’ plea regarding infringement of the principle of equal 
treatment, finding that the situation of an official in a registered partnership was 
not comparable to that of a married official, taking into account the existing situa-
tion in the member states reflecting the absence of any general assimilation of mar-
riage and other forms of statutory union. Id. at 4356–57 (¶¶ 47–52). The Court also 
rejected a plea based on the right to respect for private and family life under Article 
8 of the ECHR (no mention was made of Article 7 of the Charter in this regard). 
Id. 4358–59 (¶¶ 58–61). Another plea relating to the restriction of the free move-
ment rules was submitted too late and thus declared inadmissible. Id. at 4357–58 
(¶¶ 53–57).
81. Id. at 4353 (¶ 34).
82. Id. at 4353–54 (¶¶ 35–36).
83. Id. at 4354 (¶¶ 37–38).
84. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). For detailed discussion, see, e.g., Symposium, The 
Supreme Court’s Treatment of Same-Sex Marriage in United States v. Windsor and 
Hollingsworth v. Perry: Analysis and Implications, 64 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 823 (2014); 
see also supra note 51.
85. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices 
Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan; Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia 
and Alito issued dissenting opinions, the latter two of which Justice Thomas joined in 
all and in part, respectively.
86. 1 U.S.C. § 7. DOMA’s other operative provision, section 2, was not challenged 
in this case, but was later overturned in Obergefell. See supra note 62.
87. The opinion also dealt with jurisdictional issues. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 
2684–89.
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a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, 
and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who 
is a husband or a wife.”88 These definitions were controlling for over 
1,000 federal laws,89 including the federal tax rules that prompted 
the dispute. Here, although the applicant’s same-sex marriage was 
lawfully recognized under New York law, she was barred from claim-
ing an estate tax exemption by virtue of DOMA’s exclusion of a same-
sex partner from the definition of “spouse.”90 Although Windsor dealt 
with a challenge to the federal definition of marriage, it proved to be 
the precursor to the challenge to state marriage definitions affecting 
same-sex couples in Obergefell, as forewarned by certain dissenters 
on the Court.91
In its opinion, the Windsor majority found that section 3 of 
DOMA was unconstitutional as a deprivation of liberty protected 
by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause,92 which contains 
within it the prohibition against denying to any person the equal 
protection of the laws.93 It stressed that DOMA’s “avowed purpose 
and practical effect are to impose a disadvantage, a separate status, 
and so a stigma upon all who enter into same-sex marriages made 
lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States.”94 In short, 
DOMA frustrated New York’s objective of eliminating inequality 
by “writ[ing] inequality into the entire United States Code.”95 It 
deprived some couples married under the laws of their state, but 
not others, of both rights and responsibilities, creating two con-
tradictory marriage regimes within the same state. It also forced 
same-sex couples to live as married for the purpose of state law, but 
unmarried for the purpose of federal law, thereby diminishing the 
stability and predictability of the basic personal relations the state 
protects.96
In his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts stressed that the inter-
ests of uniformity and stability justified Congress’s decision to 
retain the definition of marriage that “at that point, had been 
adopted by every State in our Nation, and every nation in the 
world.”97 This was seconded by Justice Scalia, who pointed out 
that there were several valid rationales for the legislation.98 In 
88. Pub. L. 104–199, § 3(1), 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7).
89. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683.
90. Id. at 2683–84.
91. See id. at 2696–97 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2709–10 (Scalia, J., dis-
senting). The companion case decided on the same day, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 
S. Ct. 2651 (2013), concerning Proposition 8, a voter-enacted ballot initiative that 
amended the California Constitution to provide that only marriage between a man 
and a woman was valid and hence eliminated the right for same-sex couples to 
marry, was dismissed on standing grounds.
92. u.s. const. amend. V (“[N]or [shall any person] be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law . . . .”).
93. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693–95.
94. Id. at 2693.
95. Id. at 2694.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 2696 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 2707–08 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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addition, Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion contained references 
to foreign sources in the context of challenging the due process 
grounds of the opinion, underlining that “the right to same-sex 
marriage is not deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradi-
tion . . . [nor] in the traditions of other nations . . . [since n]o coun-
try allowed same-sex couples to marry until the Netherlands did 
so in 2000.”99
C. Potential Implications for the Mobility of Same-Sex Couples
Since Reed and D and Sweden v. Council were decided, the 
political and legal circumstances have evolved considerably at the 
national and Union levels. At the Union level, the Staff Regulations 
have been amended, with the result that certain benefits previously 
reserved for married officials are now also available to officials in 
a registered partnership provided that certain conditions are satis-
fied.100 One of these conditions is that “the couple has no access to 
legal marriage in a Member State.”101 Therefore, where same-sex 
couples have access to legal marriage, in principle they cannot claim 
benefits under a registered partnership.102 This suggests that the 
Staff Regulations recognize same-sex marriage legally contracted 
under the law of a member state; where this is not possible, same-sex 
couples in a registered partnership may claim benefits. Under these 
circumstances, the concept of “marriage” elaborated by the Court in 
D and Sweden v. Council appears to have been superseded by the 
Union legislature.103
At the national level, member states have increasingly recog-
nized same-sex marriage and other types of civil unions (as acknowl-
edged in Obergefell and Windsor), raising the question of whether 
the European Court of Justice may be inclined to reconsider its posi-
tion in future case law. This is especially true with regard to the con-
cept of “spouse” in Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2004/38104 on the free 
movement and residence rights of Union citizens and their fam-
ily members. The concept was left undefined despite the European 
Parliament’s efforts to indicate explicitly in the text that it applies 
to same-sex spouses.105 This issue relates to the mobility of same-
sex couples in terms of obstacles that arise when they move to a 
member state where their civil union or same-sex marriage is not 
99. Id. at 2715 (Alito, J., dissenting).
100. Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No. 723/2004 of 22 March 2004 Amending 
the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities and the Conditions 
of Employment of Other Servants of the European Communities, 2004 O.J. (L 124) 1. 
See also Consolidated Version of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European 
Union and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Union, 
EUR-Lex CELEX 01962R0031-20160910 [hereinafter Staff Regulations].
101. Staff Regulations, supra note 100, art. 1d(1) & Annex VII, art. 1(2)(c).
102. But see, e.g., Case F-86/09, W v. Comm’n, EUR-Lex CELEX 62009FJ0086 (Oct. 
14, 2010) (interpreting the condition of no prior access to marriage flexibly).
103. Koen Lenaerts, Federalism and the Rule of Law: Perspectives from the 
European Court of Justice, 33 Fordham Int’l L.J. 1338, 1357–58 (2011).
104. Directive 2004/38/EC, supra note 72.
105. See, e.g., Lenaerts & Gutman, supra note 66, at 54 and citations therein.
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recognized,106 and it is therefore likely to come before the Union 
judicature in the future, whether in respect of Directive 2004/38 or 
another context.107 This issue also illustrates the “pervasive effects” 
of EU law, in the sense that while in principle the member states 
have primary competence concerning the definition and legal effects 
of marriage and other forms of civil union, they must exercise such 
competence in compliance with EU law, including the free movement 
rules.108 Certainly, it is an extremely sensitive matter, and much will 
depend on the circumstances of the particular case. If (or when) the 
Court is faced with this issue under Directive 2004/38, it may choose 
to interpret the concept of “spouse” in reference to national law—
either under the state of origin principle, thereby in accordance with 
the law of the member state where the marriage took place, or under 
the host state principle, as was done for the term “registered part-
nership”109—or to formulate an autonomous EU concept of “spouse”; 
for example, choosing to exclude same-sex marriage from the scope 
of the Directive would establish uniformity and legal certainty, but 
would be apt to create inequalities reminiscent of Windsor.
In this regard, D and Sweden v. Council may be distinguished on 
several grounds. First, that case involved the Court’s formulation of 
a concept of marriage in a field of exclusive competence of the Union 
(the Staff Regulations), which may help to explain why the Court 
based its decision in part on the prevailing views of the member 
states taken as a whole. Secondly, the Court did not have the oppor-
tunity to examine the issue from the perspective of free movement, 
and its discussion of fundamental rights was limited.110 In contrast, 
pursuant to the free movement provisions of the treaties on which 
it is based, Directive 2004/38 must be interpreted with a view to 
facilitating the free movement of persons, and any justifications of 
the member state concerned would have to be applied in compliance 
with fundamental rights as indicated in Recital 31 of the Directive, 
which mentions the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of sex-
ual orientation that is enshrined in Article 21 of the Charter.111 In 
fact, depending on the case, it is conceivable that other fundamen-
tal rights guaranteed by the Charter may come into play,112 such as 
106. For detailed discussion, see, e.g., Alina Tryfonidou, EU Free Movement 
Law and the Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships: The Case for Mutual 
Recognition, 21 Colum. J. Eur. L. 195 (2015).
107. See, e.g., Case C-459/14, Cocaj v. Bevándorlási és Állampolgársági Hivatal, 
2015 O.J. (C 7) 12 (removed from the register by Order of the President of the 
Second Chamber of the Court (July 16, 2015)). See also, e.g., Notices of the European 
Union, Question for Written Answer E-001972/14 to the Commission, Right of Free 
Movement and Legal Problems for LGBT Individuals (Ole Christensen, Feb. 20, 
2014), 2014 O.J. (C 317) 54. Of note, there is a pending case before the European 
Court of Human Rights on the matter. See Orlandi v. Italy, App. No. 26431/12, http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-139934 (communicated Dec. 3, 2013).
108. Lenaerts, supra note 103, at 1339–41, 1355–61.
109. Directive 2004/38/EC, supra note 72, art. 2(2)(b).
110. See discussion supra note 80.
111. Supra note 7.
112. As compared to Article 12 of the ECHR, supra note 6 (“Men and women of 
marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family, according to the 
national laws governing the exercising of this right.”), Article 9 of the Charter (“The 
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Article 1 on the right to respect for human dignity and Article 7 on 
the right to respect for private and family life; both of these provi-
sions were explicitly emphasized by the Court in a recent case con-
cerning the interpretation of certain Union measures relating to the 
assessment of asylum applications of third-country nationals based 
on fear of persecution on account of their homosexuality.113
Furthermore, there are strong arguments, based on an analo-
gous reading of the Court’s judgments interpreting other provisions 
of EU law, that a change in status of incoming same-sex couples may 
be deemed an obstacle to free movement. For instance, in Grunkin,114 
the Court held that Article 21 TFEU precludes national authorities 
from refusing to recognize a child’s surname as determined and reg-
istered in a second member state where the child, who has only the 
nationality of the first member state, was born and has resided since 
birth.115 The Court found that having to use a surname in the mem-
ber state of which the person is a national that is different from that 
conferred and registered in the member state of birth and residence 
is liable to cause “serious inconvenience.” This is because every time 
the surname is used in a specific situation that does not correspond 
to that on the document submitted as proof of a person’s identity, 
inter alia, with a view to obtaining entitlements of some sort, the 
difference in surnames is likely to give rise to doubts as to the per-
son’s identity and the authenticity of the documents submitted or the 
veracity of their content.116
Similar arguments may be made about the “serious inconve-
nience” experienced by same-sex couples in this context, thereby 
echoing the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Obergefell, which 
pointed to the problems caused by the failure of states to recognize 
same-sex marriages lawfully performed out-of-state.117
III. compatIbIlIty revIew and fundamental rIghts adJudIcatIon
The European Court of Justice’s recourse to the comparative 
law method has assumed renewed importance in the context of its 
assessment of the compatibility of national and Union measures 
right to marry and the right to found a family shall be guaranteed in accordance with 
the national laws governing the exercise of these rights.”) was
modernised to cover cases in which national legislation recognises arrange-
ments other than marriage for founding a family. This Article neither pro-
hibits nor imposes the granting of the status of marriage to unions between 
people of the same sex. This right is thus similar to that afforded by the 
ECHR, but its scope may be wider when national legislation so provides.
Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 2007 O.J. (C 303) 17, 
21 (Explanation on Article 9).
113. Joined Cases C-148/13 to C-150/13, A v. Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en 
Justitie, EUR-Lex CELEX 62013CJ0148, ¶¶ 53–54, 65–65, 72 (Dec. 2, 2014).
114. Case C-353/06, Grunkin v. Standesamt Niebüll, 2008 E.C.R. I-7639.
115. Id. ¶ 39.
116. Id. ¶¶ 21–28. The national legislation could not be justified on the grounds 
alleged in the proceedings, id. ¶¶ 29–37, although the ECJ noted that no specific 
reason was put forward that could preclude recognition of the child’s surname, for 
instance as contrary to the public policy of the member state concerned, id. ¶ 38.
117. See supra text accompanying note 63.
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with EU fundamental rights. The compatibility of national measures 
in this regard implicates discussion of the scope of application of the 
Charter and the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in McDonald 
v. Chicago118 on the incorporation doctrine. The compatibility of 
Union measures with the Charter also illuminates some interest-
ing parallels with the U.S. Supreme Court case Ysursa v. Pocatello 
Education Association119 on the standard of review.
A. Member State Measures and the Scope of Application of the 
Charter
In principle, the convergence of national solutions in relation to 
the EU regime of fundamental rights is embodied in the Charter, 
which, as indicated in its Preamble, reaffirms fundamental rights as 
they result from, inter alia, the “constitutional traditions and inter-
national obligations common to the Member States.”120 At present, 
one of the key issues concerning the Charter is its scope of applica-
tion vis-à-vis the member states,121 which invites comparison with 
the American incorporation doctrine. As alluded to in Advocate 
General Sharpston’s opinion in Ruiz Zambrano,122 the Charter is 
basically the opposite of this doctrine, since pursuant to Article 51, 
it applies to the member states “only when they are implementing 
Union law.”123 If this is the case, in essence, the “last word” falls to 
the Union courts, whereas if it is not the case, the “last word” falls 
to the national (constitutional or supreme) courts—that is to say, the 
member states. This issue draws attention to the comparative law 
method used by the European Court of Justice in the fundamental 
rights context to discern a “Union” standard based on the “constitu-
tional traditions common to the laws of the Member States”124 and 
the leeway given to a particular national standard or constitutional 
tradition.
Yet, even where the Charter is deemed applicable, this does 
not exclude the viability of national constitutional traditions. With 
respect to the scope and interpretation of the rights and principles 
enshrined in the Charter, Article 52 states: “In so far as this Charter 
recognises fundamental rights as they result from the constitutional 
118. 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
119. 555 U.S. 353 (2009).
120. Charter, supra note 7, pmbl. ¶ 5.
121. See, e.g., Koen Lenaerts & José A. Gutiérrez-Fons, The Place of the Charter 
in the EU Constitutional Edifice, in The EU Charter of Fundamental RIghts: 
A Commentary 1559 (Steve Peers et al. eds., 2014); Michael Dougan, Judicial Review 
of Member State Action Under the General Principles and the Charter: Defining the 
“Scope of Union Law”, 52 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 1201 (2015) and citations therein.
122. Case C-34/09, Ruiz Zambrano v. Office national de l’emploi, Opinion of 
Advocate General Sharpston, 2011 E.C.R. I-1177, 1229 (¶¶ 171–73).
123. Charter, supra note 7, art. 51(1); see Case C-617/10, Åklagaren v. Åkerberg 
Fransson, EUR-Lex CELEX 62010CJ0617, ¶¶ 17–23 (Feb. 26, 2013).
124. TEU, supra note 1, art. 6(3) (“Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the 
[ECHR] and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member 
States, shall constitute general principles of the Union’s law.”).
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traditions common to the Member States, those rights shall be inter-
preted in harmony with those traditions.”125
Recently, for example, Delvigne126 turned on the application of 
the Charter (in casu the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in 
elections to the European Parliament, as guaranteed by Article 39(2), 
and the principle of legality and proportionality of criminal offenses 
and penalties, as enshrined in Article 49) to national legislation pro-
viding for a person’s permanent deprivation of civil and political 
rights, including the rights to vote and stand for election, upon con-
viction of a serious criminal offense.127
In its judgment, the Court held that it had jurisdiction to 
assess the compatibility of the national legislation concerned.128 
“Admittedly,” the Court noted, “Articles 1(3) and 8 of the 1976 Act 
Concerning the Election of the Members of the European Parliament 
by Direct Universal Suffrage129 do not define expressly and precisely 
who are to be entitled to that right, and . . . therefore, as EU law cur-
rently stands, the definition of the persons entitled to exercise that 
right falls within the competence of each Member State in compli-
ance with EU law.”130 However, the Court continued,
the Member States are bound, when exercising that compe-
tence, by the obligation in Article 1(3) of the 1976 Act, read 
in conjunction with Article 14(3) [of the Treaty on European 
Union (TEU)],131 to ensure that the election of Members of 
the European Parliament is by direct universal suffrage and 
free and secret.
Consequently, a Member State which, in implement-
ing its obligation under Article 14(3) TEU and Article 1(3) 
of the 1976 Act, makes provision in its national legisla-
tion for those entitled to vote in elections to the European 
Parliament to exclude Union citizens . . . convicted of a crim-
inal offence . . . must be considered to be implementing EU 
law within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter.132
The Court concluded that Articles 39(2) and 49 of the Charter do not 
preclude national legislation such as that at issue, since the limitations 
on the exercise of those fundamental rights imposed by that legisla-
tion satisfied the requirements of Article 52(1) of the Charter, that is 
125. Charter, supra note 7, art. 52(4).
126. Case C-650/13, Delvigne v. Commune de Lesparre-Médoc, EUR-Lex CELEX 
62013CJ0650 (Oct. 6, 2015).
127. Id. ¶¶ 14–20.
128. Id. ¶ 34.
129. Annexed to Council Decision 76/787/ECSC, EEC, Euratom of 20 September 
1976, 1976 O.J. (L 278) 1, as amended by Council Decision 2002/772/EC, Euratom of 
25 June 2002 and 23 September 2002, 2002 O.J. (L 283) 1.
130. Case C-650/13, Delvigne, ¶ 31.
131. TEU, supra note 1, art. 14(3) (“The members of the European Parliament 
shall be elected for a term of five years by direct universal suffrage in a free and 
secret ballot.”).
132. Case C-650/13, Delvigne, ¶¶ 32–33.
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to say, they were provided by law, respected the essence of those rights, 
and complied with the principle of proportionality.133 In his opinion, 
Advocate General Cruz Villalón engaged in a comparative law analysis 
in the context of the proportionality assessment, finding that member 
states may provide that a criminal conviction is grounds for depriva-
tion of the right to vote without such a provision being incompatible 
with EU law.134 In this way, the Court’s judgment may be viewed as 
being in harmony with the approaches taken in the member states.
Moreover, regarding the level of protection, Article 53 states that 
nothing in the Charter “shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely 
affecting human rights and fundamental freedoms” as recognized by, 
inter alia, the member states’ constitutions.135 Arguably, Article 53 
represents an expression of “constitutional pluralism” in the sense 
that the Court defers to the member states the question of determin-
ing the level of protection of fundamental rights consistent with their 
national constitution, provided that the Union’s essential interests are 
not adversely affected,136 as recently confirmed in Melloni.137
B. Echoes of McDonald v. Chicago
The U.S. Supreme Court grappled with similar issues related 
to the incorporation doctrine in McDonald v. Chicago.138 There, 
it held that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second 
Amendment139 right, recognized in District of Columbia v. Heller,140 
to keep and bear arms for the purpose of self-defense and thus is 
fully applicable to the states.141 As a result, the city ordinances in 
133. Id. ¶¶ 44–58.
134. Id., Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón, EUR-Lex CELEX 
62013CC0650, ¶¶ 117–20 (June 4, 2015) (noting the wide variation among the laws 
of the member states, which were “so diverse that, from the point of view of EU law, 
regard may be had only to the common minimum shared by the Member States” and 
thus to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights).
135. Charter, supra note 7, art. 53.
136. Koen Lenaerts, Exploring the Limits of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, 8 Eur. Const. L. Rev. 375, 397–99 (2012) and citations therein.
137. Case C-399/11, Melloni v. Ministerio Fiscal, EUR-Lex CELEX 62011CJ0399, 
¶ 60 (Feb. 26, 2013).
138. 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
139. u.s. const. amend. II (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the 
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be 
infringed.”).
140. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
141. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court. A majority (Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justices Alito, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas) held that the Second 
Amendment was incorporated against the states, but only a plurality (Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justices Alito, Kennedy, and Scalia) held that it was incorporated 
through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Justice Scalia filed a 
concurring opinion; Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment; Justices Stevens and Breyer filed dissenting opinions, the 
latter joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor. For detailed discussion, see, e.g., 
Case Comment, Fourteenth Amendment—Incorporation of the Right to Keep and 
Bear Arms, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 229 (2010); Symposium, Gun Control and the Second 
Amendment: Developments and Controversies in the Wake of District of Columbia 
v. Heller and McDonald v. Chicago, 39 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1339 (2012).
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question, banning handgun possession among private citizens, were 
held to be unconstitutional.142
After tracing the development of the incorporation doctrine 
in the Supreme Court’s case law,143 a plurality of the Court144 held 
that the right at issue satisfied the standards set down therein for 
incorporation under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause.145 In doing so, it rejected arguments for applying a different 
standard—namely that the clause protects only those rights “recog-
nized by all temperate and civilized governments, from a deep and 
universal sense of [their] justice”—thereby prompting discussion of 
the laws of several foreign countries (including certain EU mem-
ber states), as well as previous cases involving references to foreign 
and international law.146 The plurality also rejected arguments that 
it should depart from its established incorporation methodology on 
the grounds that it is inconsistent with federalism and stifles state 
experimentation, underscoring that
[u]nder our precedents, if a Bill of Rights guarantee is fun-
damental from an American perspective, then, unless stare 
decisis counsels otherwise, that guarantee is fully binding 
on the States and thus limits (but by no means eliminates) 
their ability to devise solutions to social problems that suit 
local needs and values.147
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens found that the rights 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause need 
not be identical in shape or scope to the rights protected against fed-
eral government infringement by the various provisions of the Bill of 
Rights, and he considered legitimate reasons for holding states to dif-
ferent standards under certain circumstances.148 He also considered 
that “the experience of other advanced democracies” undercut argu-
ments in favor of incorporation under the Due Process Clause:
The fact that our oldest allies have almost uniformly found 
it appropriate to regulate firearms extensively tends to 
weaken petitioners’ submission that the right to possess 
a gun of one’s choosing is fundamental to a life of liberty. 
While the “American perspective” must always be our focus, 
. . . it is silly—indeed, arrogant—to think we have nothing 
142. The city ordinances were repealed following the Court’s remand of the case. 
Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Chicago, 393 F. App’x. 390 (7th Cir. 2010). Yet, the Court’s 
recent cases have not put an end to matters regarding gun control in the states. See, 
e.g., Friedman v. Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 447, 484–86. (2015) (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing from the denial of certiorari).
143. See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 754–66. For background, see, e.g., Laurence 
H. TrIbe, 1 AmerIcan ConstItutIonal Law 1293–1381 (3d ed. 2000).
144. See supra note 141.
145. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767–78 and citations therein.
146. Id. at 780–82.
147. Id. at 784–85.
148. Id. at 866–70 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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to learn about liberty from the billions of people beyond our 
borders.149
C. Union Measures and the Standard of Review
The “constitutional traditions common to the Member States” 
may also figure in the European Court of Justice’s review of the 
compatibility of Union measures with the Charter. For instance, in 
Schrems,150 the Court received a reference for a preliminary rul-
ing from the High Court of Ireland concerning the interpretation, 
in light of several provisions of the Charter, of Directive 95/46151 
on the protection of personal data and, in essence, the valid-
ity of a Commission decision152 adopted pursuant to that Directive 
on the adequacy of the protection provided by the safe harbor pri-
vacy principles issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce.153 The 
case stemmed from a complaint made by Mr. Schrems, an Austrian 
national, to the Data Protection Commissioner regarding the fact 
that Facebook Ireland transferred the personal data of its users to 
the United States, which allegedly did not ensure adequate protec-
tion of the personal data held on its territory against surveillance 
activities by public authorities.154
The referring court pointed out that the mass and undifferen-
tiated accessing of personal data is contrary to the principle of pro-
portionality and the fundamental values protected by the Irish 
Constitution.155 As the case concerned the implementation of EU 
law within the meaning of the Charter and thus the decision in the 
main proceedings had to be assessed in light of EU law, it stressed 
that the right to respect for private life, guaranteed by Article 7 of 
the Charter and “by the core values common to the traditions of the 
Member States,” would be rendered meaningless if the state author-
ities were allowed to access electronic communications on a casual 
and generalized basis without any objective justification based on 
considerations of national security or the prevention of crime specific 
149. Id. at 895–96. But see id. at 800–01 (Scalia, J., concurring).
150. Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r, EUR-Lex CELEX 
62014CJ0362 (Oct. 6, 2015).
151. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of 
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, as 
amended by Regulation (EC) No. 1882/2003 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 29 September 2003, 2003 O.J. (L 284) 1.
152. Commission Decision 2000/520/EC of 26 July 2000 Pursuant to Directive 
95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Adequacy of the 
Protection Provided by the Safe Harbour Privacy Principles and Related Frequently 
Asked Questions Issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce, 2000 O.J. (L 215) 7.
153. Case C-362/14, Schrems, ¶ 67.
154. Id. ¶¶ 28–30. Incidentally, Mr. Schrems was inspired to bring the 
case by a privacy law seminar that he attended as part of his studies at the 
Santa Clara University School of Law in California. See, e.g., Mary Ellen 
McIntire, How a Law Seminar Inspired a Student to Bring a Case to Europe’s 
Top Court, Chron. HIgher Educ. (Oct. 7, 2015) http://chronicle.com/article/
How-a-Law-Seminar-Inspired-a/233682.
155. Case C-362/14, Schrems, ¶ 33.
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to the individual concerned and without being accompanied by 
appropriate and verifiable safeguards.156
In its judgment, with regard to the legality of the Commission 
decision, the Court ruled—taking into account, first, the impor-
tant role played by the protection of personal data in the light of 
the fundamental right to respect for private life and, secondly, the 
large number of persons whose fundamental rights are liable to be 
infringed where personal data are transferred to a third country not 
ensuring an adequate level of protection—that the Commission’s 
discretion as to the adequacy of the level of protection ensured by a 
third country is reduced, with the result that review of the require-
ments flowing from Article 25 of Directive 95/46, read in the light 
of the Charter, should be “strict.”157 On that basis, it declared that 
the Commission decision failed to comply with the requirements in 
question and was therefore invalid.158 Although not said outright, 
the Court’s ruling in this case cast a comparative glance towards the 
standard of “strict scrutiny” employed in the American constitutional 
setting.159
This invites comparison with the U.S. Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Association.160 That case, which 
was brought under the First Amendment’s protection of freedom of 
speech,161 concerned the constitutionality of a state law permitting 
employees to authorize payroll deductions for general union dues, 
but prohibiting such deductions for union political activities. The 
Court162 upheld the state legislation on the grounds that it did not 
restrict political speech, but rather declined to promote that speech 
by allowing public employee checkoffs for political activities.163 
Given the finding that the state had not infringed the unions’ First 
Amendment rights, it needed only to demonstrate on a rational basis 
standard, as opposed to strict scrutiny, that the ban on political pay-
roll deductions was justified. Moreover, the same deferential review 
applied regardless of whether the ban was directed at state or local 
governmental entities.164
In his opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice 
Breyer considered that there was a First Amendment interest at 
156. Id. ¶ 34.
157. Id. ¶ 78 (citing by analogy Joined Cases C-293/12 & C-594/12, Dig. Rights 
Ireland Ltd. v. Minister for Commc’ns, Marine & Nat. Res., EUR-Lex CELEX 
62012CJ0293, ¶¶ 47–48 (Apr. 8 2014)).
158. Case C-362/14, Schrems, ¶¶ 98,104–06.
159. See in this regard Siniša Rodin, Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court 
Decisions, 64 am. J. comp. l. 815, 830 (2016).
160. 555 U.S. 353 (2009).
161. u.s. const. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom 
of speech . . . .”).
162. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices 
Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, and by Justice Ginsburg as to Parts I and III. 
Justice Ginsburg filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment; 
Justice Breyer filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part; Justices 
Stevens and Souter filed dissenting opinions.
163. Ysursa, 555 U.S. at 355, 359.
164. Id. at 359, 362.
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stake, since the ban affected speech indirectly by restricting a chan-
nel through which speech-supporting finance could flow.165 Yet, 
instead of applying either a strict scrutiny or rational basis review, 
he advocated an intermediate approach based on proportionality, as 
had been contemplated by the Court “in other speech-related con-
texts, namely, [asking] whether the statute imposes a burden upon 
speech that is disproportionate in light of the other interests the gov-
ernment seeks to achieve.”166 In this regard, he pointed out, “[c]onsti-
tutional courts in other nations also have used similar approaches 
when facing somewhat similar problems,” and cited the case law 
of several foreign countries (Canada, Israel, and South Africa) and 
the European Court of Human Rights, in which proportionality was 
applied in the context of campaign financing, freedom of the press, 
and freedom of expression.167 Although Justice Breyer’s opinion con-
cerns the review of state, as opposed to federal, measures, it never-
theless highlights some remarkable parallels in the standards of 
review of the European Court of Justice and the U.S. Supreme Court 
in fundamental rights adjudication.
conclusIon
As the foregoing discussion has shown, the comparative law 
method is an essential tool of the European Court of Justice that 
helps to make EU law operational in the legal orders of the member 
states and enables it to evolve in light of the legal and social devel-
opments taking place at the Union and national levels on numerous 
fronts. Yet, as illustrated by the cases mentioned above, recourse to 
comparative analysis often implicates delicate issues relating to the 
limits and legitimacy of the judicial function vis-à-vis the constitu-
ent states and the legislature/political process in the European and 
American settings. Although the circumstances before the European 
Court of Justice and the U.S. Supreme Court in these cases are dif-
ferent, they nonetheless attest to similar challenges facing each 
Court in the context of constitutional adjudication and provide inter-
esting insights into how the Courts carry out their mandates under 
their respective constitutional charters.
165. Id. at 367 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
166. Id. This has been reiterated in subsequent case law—see, e.g., United States 
v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2551–52 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring)—though so far 
without reference to foreign and international law. For a broader discussion, see, e.g., 
Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 Yale L.J. 3094 
(2015).
167. Ysursa, 555 U.S. at 367 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
